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TESTIMONY OF

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SELECTIVE SERVICE HEARING: FUTURE MOBILIZATION NEEDS OF THE NATION

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Chairman Heck and Honorable Commissioners of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, thank you for this opportunity to present the Joint Staff perspective on how the U.S. military coordinates across the Department of Defense, Military Departments, and Combatant Commanders to mobilize the Joint Force in the event of a national emergency. My intent is to broaden shared understanding of various mobilization programs as they are uniquely tied to Joint Force readiness for large-scale contingency response. In the end, I hope these remarks assist you in your analysis of possible modifications to the readiness of the Selective Service System and structure of a future national mobilization.

GLOBALLY INTEGRATED PLANNING

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been designated by the Secretary of Defense as the Global Integrator for the Joint Force. In this role, the Chairman is responsible for assisting in strategic planning and direction of the armed forces by providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense to ensure effective Force Employment, Force Development, and Force Design to counter trans-regional, all-domain threats today and into the future. The objective of Global Integration is to broaden understanding of the simultaneous global Joint Force requirements, integrate and synchronize joint effects across all domains in a trans regional and multi-functional environment with limited resources. The 2018 National Military Strategy articulates a continuum of strategic direction to frame Global Integration over three time horizons that are used to inform risk analysis:

- Force Employment - what we do with the force today to address defense objectives
- Force Development - how we adapt concepts with the force we have today
- and Force Design – how we innovatively shape the force for tomorrow

To support globally integrated decision making and improve synchronization and integration of scarce resources, the Joint Staff has adjusted organization, processes, and tools. The objective is to iteratively improve Joint Force Employment in more strategic “ways” relative to adversaries. In particular, the Joint Staff conducts Readiness Reviews to understand the simultaneous global demands on the Joint Force in the event of a specific threat to national security (*examples include aggressive action by Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea*). During the Readiness Review process we layer the simultaneous demands to respond to emergent global threats, defend the homeland, and deter opportunistic adversary activities, to highlight the capabilities, resources and decisions that will likely require adjustments in global prioritization and allocation. These scenarios are based on significant threats to national security that will likely require expanded capacity of the Joint Force, driving the necessity for Joint Mobilization. The discussion that follows is based on the Joints Staff’s in-depth review and work building globally integrated plans.

JOINT MOBILIZATION PLANNING

For the Joint Staff, mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support strategic objectives in time of war or other national emergencies. Mobilization includes the surge in manpower resources accessed through legal authorities outlined in Title 10, U.S.C., and it also includes multiple interrelated resource areas that enable Force Generation (*how we build the force from home bases and stations*), Force Projection (*how we deploy forces to the point of crisis*), and Force Sustainment (*how we maintain the force through manpower and equipment replenishment, replacement, and repair*). This broader understanding of mobilization incorporates much more than the limited resources and capabilities that exist within the Department of Defense, highlighting our strong tie to

commercial industry and public sector. Some examples of these additional resource areas that have significant impact on Joint Force readiness include:

- *Transportation* – Military and commercial capacity to provide airlift, sealift, rail, and port operations. An example is the commercial Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).
- *Facilities and Training Base* – Service-specific plans to temporarily surge base and station capacity to accept and rapidly increase Joint Force readiness to push forward to crisis, which may include civilian augmentation to backfill base operating support gaps that are regularly fulfilled by military labor.
- *Materiel, Equipment, and the Industrial Base* – Global adjustments in prioritization, allocation, and positioning of on-hand stocks, as well as the potential expansion and acceleration of production of critical items that will likely require additional appropriation of funds.
- *Health Services* – Draw Health Service specialists from military and civilian facilities to deploy forward to the crisis, augment patient evacuation care capacity, and posture with a homeland casualty reception plan.
- *And, Communications* – Adjust prioritization and regulation of bandwidth, data and space enabled networks, and telecommunications resources at national and local levels, as well as coordinate with host nation and partners for interoperability.

A keystone resource for mobilization is Manpower. Our current plans are resource informed, based on the availability of the 2.1 Million service members that make up the All-Volunteer Force across the Military Departments. This includes personnel in the Active Component and Reserve Component (*Service Reserves and National Guard Bureau*). It is critical to recognize that in some occupational fields, up to 70% of the capacity in a particular

Service resides in the Reserve Component, which limits immediate accessibility to these capabilities. Many of our Reserve Component personnel and units are critical enablers that are necessary to respond to national emergencies. For national emergencies, the Joint Staff works through the military manpower mobilization sources legislated in Title 10, U.S.C. that provide graduated options based on the requirement. These authorities provide access to Reserve Component capacity for a designated duration of time and for a specific operation. Using any of these manpower mobilization authorities may also convey strategic messaging implications relative to adversaries, partners and allies, and our own domestic audience. Each of these authorities is based on Presidential action and have been considered as specific actions across joint planning efforts.

- *Reserve Emergency Call-Up (Title 10, Section 12304a)* can be used for involuntary activation of Reservists (*except for National Guard [Title 32] or Coast Guard Reserve [Title 14]*) for not more than 120 days in response to a Governor's request for Federal emergency assistance for major disasters or emergencies. This authority is exercised by the President with a proclamation and an executive order.
- *Selective Reserve Call-Up (Title 10, Section 12304)* can be used for involuntary activation of up to 200,000 Ready Reservists (*including up to 30,000 Inactive Ready Reservists*) for not more than 365 days to augment the Joint Force for a named operation or to support domestic response to Weapons of Mass Destruction or terrorist attack. This authority is exercised by the President with an executive order, followed by a plan for the anticipated use of forces given to Congress within 24 hours.

- *Partial Mobilization (Title 10, Section 12302)* can be used for involuntary activation of up to 1 Million Ready Reservists for up to 24 months tied to a Declaration of National Emergency by the President or Congress.
- *Full Mobilization (Title 10, Section 12301a)* is a call to active duty of all Reserve Component personnel initiated by a passage of legislation or a joint resolution of Congress declaring war or national emergency. Full mobilization is the authority to bring the entire U.S. military to bear, including all Active and Reserve Component Service members, for the duration of the war or declared emergency.

Expanding Joint Mobilization to the resources and capabilities beyond Manpower, the Defense Production Act, Title 50, U.S.C., provides access to the civilian sector – *commercial industry (manufacturing corporations and transportation providers)*. The Defense Production Act is a preparedness program established for our nation to respond to both domestic emergencies and international threats to national defense. It is designed for the diversion of certain materials, facilities, and services from ordinary use - *every day national and global economy* - to support emergent national defense purposes. The Department of Defense uses the Defense Production Act for strategic flexibility and agility in varying scope and scale based on the requirements for national security and homeland defense. Examples include:

- *Transportation* (examples: contracted commercial lift and the combination of Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement),
- *Industrial Base support* (examples: allocation of critical and strategic materials for production of vehicle armor and lightweight alloys, and acceleration of production of high demand batteries)

- and *Communications support* (examples: reallocation of bandwidth, coordination and procurement of foreign bandwidth, and repositioning of geospatial capabilities).

For large-scale national emergencies the U.S. military will require a surge of transportation capacity beyond what is organic to the Department of Defense. As a service provided under the Defense Production Act, the Emergency Preparedness Programs will be activated with approval by the Secretary of Defense. This includes up to 270 total commercial cargo and personnel aircraft as part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and up to 84 commercial ships of varying capabilities that are part of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). Although these emergency programs are not frequently used, on a regular basis US Transportation Command communicates with the associated commercial partners to validate capacity requirements and forecasted demand.

The Defense Production Act also frames relationships with the Defense Industrial Base and shapes the capabilities of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in steady-state and in response to national emergency. Under this Act, DLA maintains the National Defense Stockpile Program for strategic and critical materials and the Warstopper Program for Industrial Base Preparedness. In times of crisis, DLA and the Military Departments work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to expand production base capacity and prioritize industrial performance to support National Security objectives through the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS). The relationship between the U.S. military and our civilian and commercial partners is critical to meet the future mobilization needs of the nation.

While our military plans *are* resource informed, we frequently use operational contracting support to meet temporary and short-term requirements. The services have

contracted to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are illustrative of the impact of operational contracting support as a force multiplier. Particular skillsets and services that have frequently been contracted include transportation, computer and cyber support, base operating support, and even internal base security. Contracting options are responsive to need and are used as a way to limit military footprint forward, limit long-term growth in military force structure, and limit mobilization of the Joint Force. However, operational contracting support carries associated risks and also requires funding.

Mobilizing for national emergencies, particularly overseas, also includes coordination with Allies and Partners. Working by, with, and through our allies and partners provides capability and capacity beyond that of the U.S. military and reduces the burden of projecting U.S. forces globally. The Joint Force continues to strengthen relationships through development and validation of Acquisition Cross Service Agreements (or ACSAs), Foreign Military Sales, Building Partner Capacity, and deepening of interoperability. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.

Overall, the existing authorities by U.S.C. provide the Department of Defense with scalable options beyond organic capacity to respond to national emergency. None of our Readiness Reviews have definitively led us to the necessity to activate the Selective Service System. Our current families of plans are resource-informed, using the Joint Force that is ready today and projected forward based on anticipated funding for the Department of Defense. However, the possibility for large-scale national emergency beyond these plans still remains. The probability may be low, but the consequence could be high. In particular, the re-emergence of great power competition (*China and Russia*), with the acknowledgement of our competitor's

global reach, increases the possibility for national emergency at a level beyond our current Department of Defense capacity.

Because of these future unknowns the Military Selective Service Act legislated the establishment of the Selective Service System. This System provides a list of citizens capable of serving our nation when the directed by the President and the Congress, in an event of war or a national emergency. In order to meet this requirement, young men aged 18 to 25 years of age are required to register with the Selective Service. Should Congress activate the draft, the Selective Service System will deliver the first conscripts for induction within 193 days, with the first 100,000 inductees within 210 days. Of note, there has already been recognition that certain skillsets that require lengthy training and education may be of significance early in a National Emergency, and these fields should be considered for special programs, such as the Health Care Personnel Delivery System. Additional analysis would be required to identify the full list of critical skillsets, although those currently identifiable are health services, cyber, space, and pilots.

CONCLUSION

In closing, the recent direction for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the Global Integrator, and the ongoing Readiness Reviews have broadened our shared understanding of the simultaneous requirements of the Joint Force globally during times of national emergency or war. Current authorities for manpower mobilization (*Title 10, USC*), as well as the Defense Production Act (*Title 50, USC*) provide expansibility to meet these requirements for large-scale mobilization. Additionally, operational contracting support and the combined capabilities and capacities of our Partners and Allies enhance our comprehensive potential to respond. Each of these authorities and associations come with recognizable risk that cannot and will not be

overlooked. Finally, our current Joint Force plans do not plan for a *draft* or use of the Selective Service System, as we have developed resource-informed plans to fight with the military we have at the ready today. However, *should* our nation ever have to shift to Total Mobilization, we must have a plan to expedite force expansion.